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Abstract 
The core assumption of the bureaucratic politics model and a large part of public 
administration scholarship is that bureaucrats influence politicians and political decisions via 
their crucial role in preparing, coordinating and formulating policy. While this influence has 
been analysed in a vertical direction, i.e. how much do bureaucrats influence politicians, the 
horizontal perspective has been mostly neglected: which bureaucrats are most powerful and 
influential during the process of bureaucratic coordination and decision-making? Deducing 
hypotheses from bargaining theory and testing them with a novel network dataset on German 
Intergovernmental Relations (IGR), this contribution finds that bureaucrats indeed possess 
varying degrees of power. Jurisdictional and organizational power resources, such as voting, 
financial and institutional power but also party politics can best explain these variances in 
bureaucratic power. Personal characteristics, such as experience and education, however, are 
not used as power resources. 
 
Keywords: Bureaucratic politics, intergovernmental relations, bargaining power, social 
network analysis, Germany.  
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 Introduction 
The preparation of policy decisions is one of the core tasks of ministerial bureaucracies. 
Bureaucrats are in charge of choosing, formulating and coordinating public policy as well as 
negotiating with actors within and outside the politico-administrative system. They prepare 
policy for the head of department and government or take decisions (e.g. Peters & Pierre, 
2016). By doing so, bureaucrats carry out political tasks and can potentially influence political 
decisions. This influence can be exerted indirectly due to the role, organization and 
responsibilities of public officials as administrative working units in government (Mayntz & 
Scharpf, 1975). In many instances, bureaucrats also take decisions without the involvement of 
politicians, which is the most direct form of influence on the political process (Page, 2012). 
The strength of the bureaucratic influence thereby varies according to the stage of the policy 
process and the institutional structure of government (Schnapp, 2004). Furthermore, the 
influence and power of bureaucrats can vary with the structural and procedural role a certain 
public administration takes on during the process of policy-making (Hartlapp, Metz, & Rauh, 
2013). Thus, some bureaucratic organization or even individual bureaucrats can be more 
influential and powerful than others. Yet, little is known about which bureaucrats are more 
powerful in influencing the political process.  
Building on these key insights into bureaucratic influence and power, this contribution aims at 
developing a framework to explain differences in influence and power between ministerial 
bureaucrats. Based on the propositions of the bureaucratic politics model, it is argued that 
bureaucrats from different bureaucratic organizations pursue varying preferences. To pursue 
these preferences, they have varying power resources at their disposal. Based on the 
bargaining power framework (Bailer, 2010), these power resources will be explored.  
Measuring power and determining power resources is difficult. Most approaches compare 
initial positions with final decisions to estimate how much of the actors’ interests prevailed. 
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Such an approach is problematic for several reasons, for example strategic signalling 
(Coddington, 1968; Snyder & Diesing, 1977), but it is especially problematic when studying 
the power of bureaucrats. While politicians’ initial positions often are public, bureaucrats’ are 
not, because they usually are not public figures. To circumvent these problems, this 
contribution proposes a new way of measuring bureaucratic power by using social network 
analysis. Bureaucrats and their coordination and negotiation relations can be conceptualized 
as networks. Those actors who are most central in the coordination and negotiation process 
are then assumed to be more powerful during the decision-making process. This 
conceptualization enables to estimate which factors impact on the power and centrality of 
bureaucrats.  
The question of power and influence of bureaucrats is most pronounced in situations which 
require intensive coordination and negotiation and in which a high number of bureaucrats are 
involved. IGR, meaning processes of joint decision making among a number of government 
executives in multilevel states, represent such an occasion. For this reason, the power of 
bureaucratic actors in IGR will be analysed in this contribution. Establishing a framework of 
analysis and testing it with the most-likely case of Germany is an important step towards a 
broader and comparative analysis of the power of various bureaucrats in decision-making 
processes. 
 Bureaucratic politics in horizontal intergovernmental coordination 
The bureaucratic politics model (Allison & Halperin, 1972; Allison & Zelikow, 1999) argues 
that government decisions can only be properly understood if they are conceptualized as a 
result of the aggregate of individual decisions and actions by several actors within this 
government. A core assumption of the model is that bureaucrats develop different 
preferences, objectives and goals, which stem from ‘various conceptions of national […], 
organizational, domestic and personal interest’ (Allison & Halperin, 1972, p. 43). At the very 
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heart, these various conceptions originate from the high levels of delegation and 
specialization which are typical for modern governments (Bouckaert, Peters, & Verhoest, 
2010). These bureaucrats with their varying preferences try to influence politicians in their 
decision-making. The model clearly focuses the attention on the preferences of bureaucrats 
and the mechanisms through which these are aggregated into a government decision (Hartlapp 
et al., 2013, p. 427). While there are certainly further actors, such as parties and interests 
groups, which try to influence political decisions, this analysis concentrates on the process of 
bureaucratic decision-making. The power of the bureaucratic actors is analysed in relation to 
each other and not to other sources of influence. 
The present contribution focuses not primarily on the interests of bureaucrats per se, but on 
their power to influence the decision-making processes. The fact that they possess varying 
interests thereby makes it necessary for them to use their power to influence the decision-
making process. Power as a concept is defined in the bureaucratic politics model as „effective 
influence on government decisions and actions“ (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 300). Power 
thus is the ability of an actor to direct the decision-making process into the desired direction 
using the available means to achieve the actor’s preferred outcome (Schneider & Bailer, 2002, 
p. 52). These means are in the following called power resources. Bureaucrats possess 
unevenly distributed power resources which they can use to influence the government 
decision (Allison & Halperin, 1972). These can be resources in the strictest sense, such as 
financial means, implicit resources such as veto threats, but also personal characteristics such 
as experience. Yet, only little systematic knowledge exists about what these resources are and 
how they are distributed among bureaucrats. To advance knowledge on this topic, the present 
contribution develops propositions about power resources which bureaucrats can make use of 
when trying to influence decision-making processes. 
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While classical accounts of bureaucratic politics focus on the political-administrative 
dichotomy asking how bureaucrats can influence politicians (e.g. Hood & Lodge, 2006; 
Peters, Erkkilä, & Maravić, 2016), a similar reasoning holds in a horizontal perspective, 
namely among different bureaucrats who find themselves in joint decision-making situations. 
Government decisions are formulated and taken in a certain way because a certain department 
has more power and influence during the decision-making process than another department. 
Hence, the question arises why are some bureaucrats or departments more powerful than 
others and can better influence decisions? Which power resources make bureaucrats more 
influential?  
Governments usually consist of a rather small number of departments which are jointly 
responsible for the executive functions of government, amongst them policy formulation and 
executive decision-making. Studying bureaucratic power resources within such as setting is 
associated with some problems of small-N analysis. In contrast, a situation in which a higher 
number of departments and bureaucrats are involved in coordination processes would allow 
quantitative statistical analysis of power and power resources. IGR in multilevel states 
represent such a setting. Governments in multilevel states are interdependent in many 
instances of policy-making and engage in IGR to deal with joint problems, create joint 
solutions or simply exchange best practices (Poirier & Saunders, 2015, p. 1). For this reason, 
executives often exchange information, coordinate joint policy, but also try to protect their 
autonomy from encroachment by others and try to influence each other (Behnke & Mueller, 
2017). Thus, IGR occur whenever two or more governments in federal states must or want to 
engage in joint actions and take joint decisions. This is, for example, the case in processes of 
reforming the federal state where a joint decision needs to be taken, when sub-states in federal 
states want or need to cooperate in implementing federal or European law, or when they 
install or finance joint organizations. IGR are omnipresent coordination relations between 
executives in multilevel states.  
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In most scholarly analysis, IGR among politicians are considered, but these are usually 
supported by relations among public administrations (e.g. Hegele, 2018; Johns, O'Reilly, & 
Inwood, 2007; Parry, 2012). Public officials prepare the political IGR meetings, and just as in 
any other political process, exchange information, prepare and even negotiate decision or take 
decisions on their own. Thus, due to the high number of government organizations involved 
in IGR (core executives and departments from each government involved), this offers an ideal 
setting to study the power resources of public administrations.  
The horizontal process of decision preparation and decision making among departments and 
government actors is often analysed under the topic of coordination. While coordination, 
defined as an output or ‘an end-state in which the policies and programmes of government are 
characterized by minimal redundancy, incoherence and lacunae’ (Peters, 1998, p. 296), might 
be achieved to a varying degree by governments and their departments, coordination defined 
as a process is one of the key actions in which governments and their departments regularly 
engage. Coordination as a process emphasizes the ‘strategies and instruments governments 
use to coordinate organizations or programs within the public sector’ (Bouckaert et al., 2010, 
p. 16). This involves analysing ‘the development of ideas about joint and holistic working, 
joint information systems, dialogue between agencies, processes of planning, and making 
decisions’ (Six, 2004, p. 106). Coordination is thus conceptualized as the ‘intervening stage of 
debate and deliberation [during which] persuasion, reconsideration, conceivably even 
coercion takes place’ (Shepsle & Boncheck, 1997, p. 44) before a joint decision is taken. 
Simplifying Metcalfe’s (1994) nine-step coordination scale, the process of coordination is 
conceptualized as the exchange of information, the search for allies, and the negotiation of 
compromise or decisions. First, actors exchange information and viewpoints in order to 
reduce uncertainty about the interests and goals of other actors. Second, they negotiate by 
trying to form alliances with actors with similar interests and goals or find a compromise with 
actors which have different interests or goals. The power of bureaucrats and their power 
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resources are likely to differ between these two processes. Some actors might be more 
powerful in the information exchange network, others when it comes to negotiations. Based 
on these insights, two coordination networks among bureaucrats will be conceptualized in this 
contribution, one network of information exchange and one network of negotiation.  
 Bureaucratic power resources 
What are the power resources of bureaucrats which they can use to exert influence on the 
decision-making process? Bargaining literature in political science has brought forth a 
number of theoretical arguments for resources, which make some actors more powerful. The 
most prominent and established power resources of actors are voting power, economic power, 
institutional power and domestic constraints. Furthermore, initial evidence is found for party 
politics and personal experience as power resources. While these theoretical arguments 
usually have been tested on the political level, they possess a broader scope of validity. 
Similar power resources are available to bureaucrats when preparing and negotiating political 
decisions. Bureaucrats in joint decision situations can make use of jurisdictional or 
organizational as well as individual power resources. In IGR, one bureaucrat usually 
represents one department. Thus, each bureaucrat represents and speaks for this department 
and at the same time can make use of the department’s power resources. Due to the structural 
similarity between the EU’s Council of Ministers negotiation and IGR (Poirier, Saunders, & 
Kincaid, 2015; Scharpf, 1985), this article applies the theoretical assumptions by Bailer 
(2010) and Tallberg (2008) for the EU Council of Ministers to IGR in multilevel states in 
general and bureaucratic decision-making processes in particular. The present contribution 
will thus be the first to test all these possible power resources under one combined framework 
and with a coherent empirical dataset.  
Voting power as a power resource assumes that the more votes an actor has in a joint 
decision situation, the more powerful this actor is because his or her voting choices carry 
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more weight than those of actors with fewer votes (Bailer, 2010, p. 745; Tallberg, 2008, p. 
694). This argument of course only holds for majority voting situations with weighted votes. 
Bureaucrats can similarly use voting power as a power resource because in bureaucratic 
decision-making processes, the bureaucrats represent their jurisdiction and thus the number of 
votes associated.  
H1: The higher the number of votes a bureaucrat represents in a majority-voting 
situation with weighted votes, the more powerful the actor is. 
Economic or financial power can be a power resource because joint decisions often have 
financial consequences, which need to be distributed among the participating actors. Hence, 
the support by actors with more financial resources is necessary in order to make the decision 
meaningful and their implementation realistic. Similarly to voting power, the bureaucrats 
represent their jurisdiction in decision situations and thus also the economic or financial 
power of the jurisdiction. 
H2a: Bureaucrats representing richer jurisdictions are more powerful than those from 
poorer jurisdictions.  
On an organizational level, the ministries of finance can be assumed to be more powerful than 
the other departments within the jurisdiction because they play an important role in allocating 
resources among ministries and need to agree on any additional investments and long-term 
expenditures (Heller, 2015). Thus, it can be assumed that bureaucrats representing the finance 
ministries also represent this kind of financial power in joint decision situations.  
H2b: Bureaucrats representing the departments of finance are more powerful than 
bureaucrats from other departments. 
Institutional power is ‘the ability to exit, veto and set intuitional agendas’ (Bailer, 2010, p. 
746). Veto and exit rights bring the threat of leaving the decision processes and thus have a 
higher probability of creating concessions from the other actors. These resources are however 
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distributed equally among the actors and only used rarely (for EU council negotiations see 
Tallberg, 2008, p. 694). Agenda setting, on the other hand, is likely to be a relevant power 
resource. Agenda setters usually have an information advantage and control the procedures 
through their ‘responsibility to manage the agenda, broker agreements and represent the 
decision body vis-à-vis third parties’ (Tallberg, 2008, p. 696). This is assumed to be an 
important power resource for bureaucrats because as experts with detailed knowledge on the 
subject, they can act as agenda setters and thus draw on this power resource. 
H3a: Bureaucrats representing the agenda setting department or jurisdiction are 
more powerful than bureaucrats from the other departments or jurisdictions. 
Additionally, on the organizational level, the core executives have agenda setting power 
within their jurisdiction and thus can be expected to be more powerful (Dahlström, Peters, & 
Pierre, 2011; Peters, Rhodes, & Wright, 2003). Thus, bureaucrats representing the core 
executives in joint decision situations can use their formal position as power resource. 
H3b: Bureaucrats representing the head of government are more powerful than 
bureaucrats from the functional departments. 
Reflecting on agenda setting and veto power in IGR, the role of the federal government comes 
to mind. In most federal states, the federal government has a prominent position. It can put 
issues on the IGR or public agenda and very often its agreement or support is needed for a 
decision to be ratified or implemented successfully. Bureaucrats representing the federal level 
could use this as a power resource.  
H3c: Bureaucrats representing the federal government are more powerful than 
bureaucrats from the sub-state governments.  
Domestic constraint is a power resource that is typical for two-level games, which IGR are 
as well. If actors are constrained in their leeway of action at the second (in this case 
intergovernmental) level by actors at the first (in this case government) level, this makes them 
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more powerful because the other intergovernmental actors need to make bigger concessions to 
get their support or agreement (Bailer, 2010, p. 747; Putnam, 1988). In bureaucratic IGR, the 
win-set of an actor can be limited by the other bureaucrats within its jurisdiction or, in cases 
of coalition governments, by the coalition partner.  
Several departments of each jurisdiction are involved in coordinating and negotiating IGR 
decisions. These departments can choose either to pursue their interests individually or to 
coordinate amongst each other. If they choose to coordinate internally, it is very likely that the 
result will be an interdepartmental or jurisdictional position. According to the domestic 
constraint argument, this strategy gives them more power in IGR because they can credibly 
argue that a deviation from this position is not possible and their negotiation partner would 
need to make concessions in order to find an agreement or compromise. 
H4a: The bureaucrats representing a jurisdiction where the departments are closely 
coordinated are more powerful than bureaucrats from less coordinated jurisdictions. 
In coalition governments, the coalition partners could mutually decrease each other’s leeway 
of action on the intergovernmental level. Assuming that IGR decisions in the end need the 
agreement of both coalition partners, this mutual decrease of leeway is the more likely, the 
higher the ideological distance between the coalition partners. Coalition partners with a high 
ideological distance have a lower overlap of win-sets and thus a less flexible common 
position, which they can use to gain concessions from the other IGR actors.  
H4b: Bureaucrats representing a jurisdiction where the coalition partners have a high 
ideological distance are more powerful than bureaucrats from less ideologically 
distant coalition governments. 
IGR in federal states are the ideal unit of analysis to study party politics on an equal footing 
with other power resources. In federal states, clearly defined party families and at least some 
state-wide parties exists and are involved in IGR (Bolleyer, Swenden, & McEwen, 2014) 
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while in the study of EU and international relations, party families are more vague and parties 
and elections are still based on the national state level (Bailer, 2010). The affiliation of the 
political head of the government to a party family affects the bureaucratic actors in IGR 
insofar as the bureaucrat represents the department and its political head in IGR. Thus, 
through various forms of politicization, most importantly functional politicization (Schwanke 
& Ebinger, 2006), party political considerations play a role in bureaucratic decision-making 
processes as well. Assuming that actors whose political superiors are affiliated to the same 
party family share some ideological viewpoint, the number of party peers involved in the 
negotiation process could be used as a power resource.  
H5a: Bureaucrats representing coalition partners with higher numbers of political 
party peers are more powerful than bureaucrats with lower numbers of peers. 
Furthermore, congruence of government composition is important in IGR (Bolleyer et al., 
2014; León, 2017). Due to the prominent role of the federal government in many IGR 
processes, party congruence with the federal level could be a power resource.  
H5b: Bureaucrats representing a government which is congruent with the federal 
government are more powerful than bureaucrats from incongruent governments. 
Moving now to the power resources of the individual actors, experience can be expected to 
matter (Bailer, 2010, p. 746; Tallberg, 2008, p. 698f.). The longer an actor is involved in IGR, 
the more experience (s)he has. Experienced actors can be an important source of information 
because they were involved in prior processes and might know more about the subject than is 
written down in any document. Furthermore, they also know the other actors and possibly 
their negotiation behaviour. Additionally, with growing experience, actors might have 
developed negotiation strategies which prove more successful. Experience as a power 
resource might even be more important for bureaucrats than for politicians because they 
usually stay longer in their position and thus can acquire more experience over the years. 
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H6a: The more years of experience bureaucrats have, the more powerful they are. 
Related to this, the educational background and training could have an effect on how 
bureaucrats behave and which strategies they choose in decision-making processes (Bailer, 
2010, p. 746; Tallberg, 2008, p. 701). Public administration research has shown that among 
the demographic variables, educational background has the strongest impact on a bureaucrat’s 
attitudes and behaviour. According to Christensen and Lægreid (2009), a legal education 
leads individuals to be more rule driven and paying attention to legal requirements while a 
bureaucrats with a political or social science education are more sensitive to politics and 
political signals and are more working on coordination tasks. Having power on the decision 
by directing the decision-making process in a favourable direction needs political sensitivity 
and skill. Thus, it can be assumed that bureaucrats with a political or social science education 
are more powerful than those with a legal education. 
H6b: Bureaucrats with a political or social science education are more powerful than 
bureaucrats with a legal education. 
 Research design, data and operationalization 
The research question of which actors are more powerful than others when conducting IGR 
will be answered using a y-centred, quantitative research design, testing the different power 
resources within a multiple regression model.  
4.1 Case selection and description 
In order to test new theories or new applications of a theory, most-likely cases are the 
appropriate choice because the theoretically expected phenomenon is most likely to be present 
there. If it is not, the theory is unlikely to apply to other, less likely cases (Rohlfing, 2012). 
The German case is a most-likely case for the analysis of power and power resources in 
bureaucratic IGR because the German ministerial bureaucracy is regarded as one of the most 
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powerful in comparative perspective (Schnapp, 2004) and it has one of the most elaborate and 
stable systems of bureaucratic IGR. 
The German ministerial bureaucracy plays a crucial role in policy formulation and decision-
making. Ministerial bureaucrats develop and formulate policy initiatives and coordinate and 
negotiate proposals with other actors inside the bureaucracy with the aim of including all 
relevant aspects and interests at an early stage in order to avoid conflict within government at 
a later stage (Mayntz & Scharpf, 1975, pp. 67-76; Page, 2012). When it comes to IGR, the 
ministerial bureaucracy plays a similar role in developing, formulating and coordinating 
policy with their counterparts from the other sub-states and the federal state. In this respect, 
Wagener (1979) described the ‘brotherhood of experts’ (Fachbruderschaften), a vast network 
of IGR among bureaucrats from the federal state and the sub-states working within one sector.  
The German system of IGR is one of the most institutionalized and stable systems consisting 
of the Bundesrat and 18 ministerial conferences (Auel, 2014; Hegele & Behnke, 2017; Lhotta 
& Blumenthal, 2015). The ministerial conferences are voluntary meetings of the sub-state 
governments with the aim of exchanging information and coordinating amongst each other 
and with the federal government. The Bundesrat is a constitutional organ, the second chamber 
through which the sub-states’ governments directly participate in federal legislation and 
represent the interests of their sub-state in federal decision-making. The Bundesrat is more 
institutionalized and meets more regularly than the ministerial conferences. Furthermore, in 
the Bundesrat, all actors are engaged in inter-sectoral coordination, while the ministerial 
conferences are organized sectorally. Thus, the Bundesrat is chosen as the case for analysis 
here. 
The Bundesrat as a whole holds important veto rights in federal legislation. When the 
administrative power of the German sub-states (Länder) and their finances are affected as 
well as for constitutional changes, the consent of the (qualified) majority of the votes is even 
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mandatory for ratification (Art. 52, 77 Basic Law). The Bundesrat holds an absolute veto in 
these cases, which constitute up to 40 percent of federal legislation. In all other cases, it can 
call a mediation committee and has at least a suspensive veto that can severely delay the 
process but be overruled with a Bundestag majority (Art. 77 Basic Law). Additionally, the 
Bundesrat itself can initiate federal law (Art. 76 (1) Basic Law). The Länder in the Bundesrat 
have three to six votes, depending on their population. Each Land casts its votes uniformly; 
separation of votes is not allowed, and abstentions are equal to “no” votes (Art. 51 Basic 
Law).  
In order to prepare the Bundesrat sessions and decisions, a vast bureaucratic apparatus has 
been set up. Within each department of the federal state and each sub-state, a section or staff 
unit is responsible for the preparation of Bundesrat matters when the department is involved. 
Additionally, there exists a section in each government chancellery at both levels of 
government (Bundeskanzleramt, Staats- und Senatskanzleien). This section is responsible for 
the coordination of the department sections in order to come to a joint Land position. To 
coordinate Bundesrat matters with the other Länder and the federal state, a special division of 
the government chancellery called Land representation (Landesvertretung) is stationed 
directly in the capital Berlin (Schrenk, 2010). All these ministerial bureaucrats usually not 
politicians or political appointees but career civil servants staying in this coordination position 
even when the party composition of the government changes. These bureaucrats meet 
repeatedly in a recurring three-week sequence in order to prepare Bundesrat decisions 
(Schrenk 2010).  
4.2 The network dataset 
To capture the bureaucratic coordination process surrounding the Bundesrat, a network 
dataset was collected by the author in a standardized online survey among the Länder 
government actors in Germany from August to November 2015. The survey was sent out to 
15 
 
bureaucrats responsible for multilevel or Bundesrat coordination in all 171 ministerial 
bureaucracies (i.e. government chancelleries, Land representations and sectoral departments) 
of all the Länder. Showing to the respondents a list of possible contact partners by position, 
they were asked ‘Please indicate, with whom of the following actors you have contact during 
the preparation of the Bundesrat.’ Thus, they were asked about their individual contacts and 
coordination behaviour. In a second step they were presented with a table of the chosen actors 
and asked: ‘You have indicated that you have contact to the following actors. With whom of 
these actors do you pre-negotiate final decisions?’. Thus, data for two networks was collected: 
a network of information exchange and a network of negotiation. The relations reported can 
be interpreted as a mean value of typical information exchange and negotiation contacts over 
the last year. If respondents have not indicated a contact with another actor, this either means 
that no contact takes place or that it is not relevant to the actor. All sixteen German sub-states 
participated in the survey with a response rate of 65% (112 out of 171), without any 
systematic missings occurring (for descriptive statistics of the networks see TABLE 1). 
 
TABLE 1: Descriptive statistics of the Networks 
Network No. 
actors 
No. 
relations 
Edgewise 
reciprocity 
Min. 
indegree 
centrality 
Max. 
indegree 
centrality 
Mean 
indegree 
centrality 
Information Exchange 
Network 
186  
 
2414 37% 1 28 13 
Negotiation Network 1834 1329 26% 1 18 7 
 
4.3 Measuring power in social networks 
The dependent variable, power in bureaucratic IGR, is operationalized using the centrality 
concept of social network analysis. Social network analysis is an appropriate tool to research 
power because power as such is relational (McClurg & Young, 2011, p. 39). Power defined as 
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the ability of an actor to direct the decision-making process into the desired direction can be 
achieved by communicating with other actors during the process. Network data of 
communication relations is genuine process data which is able to overcome some of the well-
known problems of the analysis of negotiations and power, namely the ‘difficulties of 
conducting research on a […] body that convenes behind closed doors, whose proceedings are 
undocumented and whose participants are unusually hard to gain access to’ (Tallberg, 2008, 
p. 686). In empirical studies, these problems are usually addressed by approximating the 
power of actors by comparing initial positions of actors and final outcomes of negotiations. 
This approach however has attracted considerable criticism for various reasons (see Bailer, 
2010). Using network data on the bureaucratic decision-making process can help overcome 
these problems by providing information on the actual conduct of decision-making processes. 
Centrality is repeatedly used as operationalization and measurement for concepts such as 
‘power’, ‘(structural) importance’, ‘strategic significance’ and ‘importance of prominence’ 
(Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Henning, 2009; Scott, 2013, p. 83; Wasserman & Faust, 2009, p. 
169). Centrality in the network theoretically indicates that actors have a pronounced position 
in the network. Among the several options which exist to measure centrality in networks 
(Freeman, 1978) indegree centrality is chosen in this analysis. It measures centrality based on 
the incoming communication relations of an actor. With the data used here, an actor has an 
incoming relation, if another actor named him as communication partner.  
This measure is chosen due to theoretical considerations as well as consideration of the data 
generating process. Theoretically, a high number of incoming communication ties indicates 
that the other actors perceive the contact to the actor of interest as relevant in the decision-
making process, at least relevant enough to report it. If many actors report that they are in 
contact with the actor, it can be reasonably assumed that this actor is powerful. In the network 
of information exchange, a high indegree centrality means that this actor is powerful because 
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(s)he is in possession of more information from different sources and can also control the 
information flow by providing or retaining this or that piece of information. In the negotiation 
network, high indegree centrality indicates power because actors with a high number of 
negotiation relations can influence several processes of finding agreement and compromise. 
Additionally, they usually have various options for compromise among which they can 
choose the one most profitable for them. 
Furthermore, from the viewpoint of the data generating process, indegree centrality is less 
prone to manipulation by the actors. First, while the reporting of outdegree centrality can be 
manipulated by an actor in the attempt to make oneself look more powerful, this is not 
possible for indegree centrality because it relies on the information provided by others. 
Second, the response rate of the survey is 65% meaning that 35% of the actors have an 
outdegree value of zero because they did not report any contacts but could be named by the 
other actors as contacts. Other measures such as betweenness centrality, which measures the 
potential to control the relations between other actors, or closeness centrality, which measures 
the distance of one actor to all other actors, capture theoretically distinct concepts (Feeman 
1987). Further, their reliance on incoming as well as outgoing ties would lead to a biased 
measurement due to non-respondents with zero values, which indegree does not. 
4.4 Operationalizing power resources 
The independent variables need to be specified for the application in the context of German 
bureaucratic IGR (see Table 2; Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables). 
Voting power as a power resource might be relevant in the German Bundesrat because 
decisions are taken by majority-vote weighted according to the number of inhabitants. In 
terms of financial power, the German federal fiscal equalization scheme is oriented towards 
solidarity (Behnke, 2013) and thus levels differences in the financial endowment by 
redistributing resources among sub-states. This system, however, creates a group of net-
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contributors with higher financial resources and net-beneficiaries with lower financial 
resources, the former being potentially more powerful.   
 
TABLE 2: Independent variables and their operationalization 
Coordination 
resource 
Conceptualization Operationalization Data source 
Voting power Number of votes in the 
Bundesrat 
Number of votes as Numerical 
variable 
Bundesrat homepage 
 
Financial 
power 
Net-contributor 
 
 
Finance ministries 
Dummy, 1 for net-contributor  
 
 
Dummy, 1 for finance 
ministry 
German federal ministry of 
finance, financial 
equalization data from 2015 
as indicated in survey 
Institutional 
power 
Bundesrat presidency 
 
Government chancellery 
 
Federal level 
Dummy, 1 for presidency 
 
Dummy, 1 for government 
chancellery 
Dummy, 1 for federal level 
Printed matter of the 
Bundesrat 452/14. 
as indicated in survey 
 
as indicated in survey 
Experience Experience in multi-level 
coordination (in years) 
Education  
Numerical variable 
 
Dummies: law, politics or 
public administration, others 
(baseline) 
as indicated in survey 
 
as indicated in survey 
Domestic 
constraint 
Density of intra-
governmental network 
 
Ideological distance of 
parties in government 
Numerical, standardized 
density of the intra-
governmental network 
Numerical variable, distance 
between parties 
Calculated based on survey 
data 
 
Bräuninger and Debus 
(2011), Appendix B, left-
right scores, absolute 
difference 
Party politics Party congruence with 
federal level  
No. of party peers  
Party of the Minister  
Dummy, 1 for full congruence 
 
Numerical  
Dummies: SPD, Greens, Left, 
CDU/ CSU (beaseline), 
Homepages Bundesrat, 
federal and sub-state 
governments 
 
Regarding institutional power resources, due to the majority-voting rule, no single actor 
possess the right to veto individually Bundesrat decisions. Similarly, there are no exit-options 
because the German Länder governments are automatically members of the Bundesrat, 
abstentions are counted as “no” vote. The ability to set the agenda, however, might be 
important in Bundesrat negotiations. The presidency of the Bundesrat rotates among the 
Länder, on a yearly basis, from the most to the least populated Land. The Land that holds the 
presidency is responsible for organizing and preparing the plenary sessions, dealing with the 
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committees, and contact with the federal government (Reuter, 2007, p. 320). Additionally, 
each Bundesrat committee is also presided by one of the Länder (Printed matter of the 
Bundesrat 452/14). Further, the bureaucrat representing the head of government of each Land 
can be assumed to have agenda setting power within the Länder based on the prime ministers’ 
competence for determining the general policy guidelines (Richtlinienkompetenz). 
Furthermore, the federal government might be more powerful in IGR in the Bundesrat even 
though it does not have any formal voting rights. During the legislative process, the German 
Bundestag in many instances does not need the consent of the Bundesrat for ratification and 
even if it does, in some cases it can overrule a rejection (Article 77 Basic Law). 
Domestic constraint as power resource will be operationalized in two ways. First, the density 
of the intragovernmental network in information exchange is used to measure the amount of 
exchange and coordination between the departments of one jurisdiction. A high density 
indicates a higher amount of internal coordination. Due to the bias in the density measure 
resulting from varying non-response rates among the Länder, density values are standardized 
by the percentage of participating actors, assuming that the non-respondents would have, in 
the mean, reported the same amount of contacts than the respondents in each Land. Second, 
the distance between the coalition partners is measured based on the dataset on parties' policy 
positions compiled by Bräuninger and Debus (2011) using the absolute left-right difference 
among the sub-state parties in government in autumn 2015. Since the distance is quite stable 
during the period investigated by the authors, it seems legitimate to use the late-2000’s data to 
approximate the distance in 2015.  
In the German Bundesrat, party politics matter (Hegele, 2018; Lehmbruch, 2000; Leunig & 
Träger, 2014). Congruence with the federal level as power resource exists if the exact same 
parties constitute the sub-state government as the federal government. Furthermore, the 
number of bureaucrats whose ministers are affiliated with the same party family will be 
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included. Due to a lack of research on party politics as power resource, the theoretical status 
of party politics is unclear; therefore the individual parties are included in the model as a 
control variable. It might be that some political parties are more powerful than others for 
reasons yet to determine. 
The experience and educational background of the actors was surveyed in the online 
questionnaire. In Germany, bureaucrats usually have an education in law (Derlien, 2002). 
Some bureaucrats have a background in political science or public administration. Hence, also 
for the German case, it will be expected that an education in law decreases while an education 
in politics or public administration increases the power of an actor.  
TABLE 3: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables 
Variable min max median mean  sd 
No votes in Bundesrat 3 6 4 4.36 1.13 
Net-contributor 0 1 0 0.27 0.44 
Finance ministries 0 1 0 0.09 0.29 
Bundesrat presidency 0 1 0 0.10 0.30 
Government chancellery 0 1 0 0.09 0.29 
Federal level 0 1 0 0.08 0.27 
Density of intra-governmental network (in percent) 47 99 71 70.65 13.73 
Ideological distance of parties in government 2 325 159 128.22 102.65 
Party congruence with federal level 0 1 0 0.36 0.48 
No. of party peers 8 98 98 71.05 30.26 
Party of the Minister - CDU 0 1 0 0.29 0.45 
Party of the Minister – SPD 0 1 1 0.52 0.50 
Party of the Minister – Green 0 1 0 0.15 0.35 
Party of the Minister – Left 0 1 0 0.04 0.20 
Experience in multi-level coordination (in years) 1 43 6 8.72 7.65 
Education – law  0 1 1 0.52 0.50 
Education – politics & administration 0 1 0 0.27 0.44 
 
 Empirical results 
To test the hypotheses, a multiple regression analysis is performed. One set of models is 
calculated using centrality in the information exchange network and one using the negotiation 
network as dependent variable. Several different model specifications are calculated for each 
network (see TABLE 4and TABLE 5). The ‘full models’ include all independent variables, 
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models (a) and (b) are calculated due to the high correlation of the party political variables. In 
the ‘jurisdictional & organization models’ the variables measuring experience are excluded 
because these are only available for those actors who participated in the survey. The ‘federal 
models’ only contains those variables, which are also available and meaningful for the federal 
level. The control variable participation in survey is included in the models to control for 
differences between those actors who participated in the survey and those who did not. The 
results show that no significant differences exist between these two groups of actors. In the 
information exchange network (TABLE 4) and the negotiation network (TABLE 5), 
institutional power resources, domestic constraints and party politics have a clear impact on 
power. Bureaucrats from the government chancellery are more central than the other 
bureaucrats, confirming hypothesis 3b. This institutional power resource has the strongest, 
significant and positive, effect on power which is also stable across model specifications and 
corresponds to the expectations. The effects of the other two institutional power resources are 
less clear. Bundesrat presidency (H3a) has a positive effect as expected, yet it is not 
significant. Being from the federal level (H3c) does not have a clear effect on power in the 
information exchange network. In the negotiation network, however, bureaucrats from the 
federal level are clearly and significantly less powerful, which contradicts the initial 
expectation. Bureaucrats from the federal government are apparently included as actors 
among others when it comes to information exchange in the Bundesrat process, but are 
excluded when it comes to negotiating final positions, which takes place primarily among the 
sub-state actors. 
The density of the intragovernmental network has a positive and stable effect on centrality in 
both networks, confirming hypothesis 4a. The closer the bureaucrats within one government 
coordinate, the more powerful these actors are in IGR. Hence, communicating with the other 
departments within the own jurisdiction makes the bureaucrats more powerful. The distance 
between the coalition partners (H4b) on the other hand has rather a negative effect on power. 
22 
 
This contradicts the initial hypotheses as it indicates that governments with a lower distance 
between the coalition partners are more powerful. This could be explained by another 
mechanism, namely that bureaucrats from governments where the coalition partners are 
ideologically closer to each other are better able to speak with one voice in IGR and thus can 
jointly pursue their interests.  
Party politics indeed also are a power resource in IGR processes, albeit in a different form 
than expected. Interestingly, the models show that in the information exchange and the 
negotiation network, especially the Lefts and Greens and to a lower extent the Social 
Democrats are more powerful compared to the Christian Democrats. The Lefts and the Greens 
are both not part of the federal government and in the Länder are usually the smaller coalition 
partners of the Social or Christian Democrats. This indicates that during IGR in the 
Bundesrat, the smaller parties are more powerful because their agreement is needed in order 
to find an intragovernmental decision and avoid abstention. This makes them strongly 
involved in the information exchange network and gives them power when it comes to 
negotiations. On the other hand, neither the number of party political peers nor the 
congruence with the federal level impact on the power of bureaucratic actors, as postulated in 
hypotheses 5a and 5b. 
Voting power and financial power as power resources have an effect in the negotiation 
network but not the information exchange network, thus partly confirming hypotheses 1 and 
2a. This indicates that when it comes to decision-making, these two hard power resources are 
more important. In the negotiation network, voting power has a strong positive and significant 
effect as expected. Bureaucrats representing Länder with a higher number of votes are more 
central and powerful when it comes to negotiations. Similarly, bureaucrats representing the 
net-contributors in the federal financial equalization scheme are more powerful actors in 
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negotiations confirming the expectation. The finance ministries also seem to have a positive, 
yet not always significant, effect on power (H2b).  
 
TABLE 4: Determinants of Centrality in the Information Exchange Network 
 Full 
Model 
(a)  
Full 
Model 
(b) 
Jurisdictional 
& 
Organization 
Model (a) 
Jurisdictional 
& 
Organization 
Model (b) 
Federal 
Model 
(a) 
Federal 
Model 
(b) 
Voting Power       
No. BR votes 0.451 0.510* 0.319 0.223   
 (0.320) (0.196) (0.422) (0.299)   
Financial Power       
Net Contributor -0.262 -0.174 1.029 0.646   
 (1.046) (0.805) (1.005) (0.813)   
Finance Ministry 1.327 1.445 2.179 2.131 2.238* 2.313 
 (1.530) (1.598) (1.261) (1.376) (1.048) (1.199) 
Institutional Power        
BR Presidency 0.875 1.181 1.964 2.096*   
 (0.741) (0.704) (0.953) (0.853)   
Government Chancellery 4.251*** 4.441*** 5.253*** 5.357*** 5.831*** 6.124*** 
(0.960) (1.005) (0.852) (0.876) (0.866) (0.915) 
Federal Level     -1.097 0.148 
     (0.524) (0.504) 
Domestic Constraint       
Density intragovernmental 
network 
0.083** 0.064* 0.098** 0.0798*   
(0.0246) (0.028) (0.0271) (0.0305)   
Distance coalition parties -0.210 0.001 -0.572 -0.158   
(0.451) (0.439) (0.337) (0.338)   
Party Politics       
Party Congruence (fed.) -1.5530  -0.232    
(0.909)  (1.132)    
No. Party peers -0.0012  -0.0103  -0.0042  
 (0.0158)  (0.0116)  (0.0154)  
SPD  2.794**  1.784  2.560* 
  (0.883)  (0.852)  (0.876) 
Greens  3.550*  2.671  3.773** 
  (1.411)  (1.286)  (1.072) 
Left  5.329***  4.496***  5.898*** 
  (0.963)  (0.772)  (1.050) 
Experience       
Years in IGR  -0.0507 -0.0401     
(0.0436) (0.0416)     
Education Law -0.629 -0.635     
 (1.329) (1.323)     
Education Politics or 
Administration 
0.123 0.370     
(1.420) (1.258)     
Participation in survey   1.184 1.227   
  (0.652) (0.676)   
N 103 103 160 160 186 186 
adj. R2 0.182 0.251 0.287 0.324 0.206 0.299 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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TABLE 5: Determinants of Centrality in the Negotiation Network 
 Full 
Model 
(a)  
Full 
Model 
(b) 
Jurisdictional 
& 
Organization 
Model (a) 
Jurisdictional 
& 
Organization 
Model (b) 
Federal 
Model 
(a) 
Federal 
Model 
(b) 
Voting Power       
No. BR votes 0.704* 0.540* 0.682** 0.526**   
 (0.288) (0.216) (0.174) (0.145)   
Financial Power        
Net Contributor 2.629* 1.945 2.317** 1.682**   
 (1.188) (0.933) (0.644) (0.538)   
Finance Ministry 1.846 1.899 1.863 1.852 1.743* 1.831* 
 (1.224) (1.215) (0.888) (0.930) (0.732) (0.817) 
Institutional Power        
BR Presidency 1.129 1.201 1.133 1.181 1.129 1.201 
 (0.898) (0.936) (0.745) (0.701) (0.898) (0.936) 
Government Chancellery 4.555*** 4.673*** 4.921*** 5.000*** 5.090*** 5.327*** 
(0.705) (0.643) (0.652) (0.626) (0.589) (0.574) 
Federal Level     -2.756*** -2.131*** 
     (0.330) (0.306) 
Domestic Constraint       
Density intragovernmental 
network 
0.074* 0.0545* 0.0658*** 0.0525**   
(0.0265) (0.0209) (0.0140) (0.0136)   
Distance coalition parties -0.729 -0.273 -0.694** -0.286   
(0.409) (0.285) (0.227) (0.210)   
Party Politics       
Party Congruence (fed.) 0.174  0.488    
(0.899)  (0.598)    
No. Party peers -0.003  -0.0079  -0.008  
 (0.010)  (0.0064)  (0.006)  
SPD  1.474  0.826  1.029* 
  (0.688)  (0.695)  (0.480) 
Greens  2.110  1.570  2.469** 
  (1.290)  (1.152)  (0.737) 
Left  2.290**  1.881*  2.167* 
  (0.631)  (0.635)  (0.833) 
Experience       
Years in IGR  -0.015 -0.014     
(0.038) (0.036)     
Education Law -0.264 -0.480     
 (0.814) (0.748)     
Education Politics or 
Administration 
0.001 0.080     
(0.984) (0.918)     
Participation in survey   0.857 0.876   
  (0.441) (0.441)   
N 103 103 160 160 183 183 
adj. R2 0.309 0.339 0.428 0.440 0.387 0.433 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Contrary to the expectations, experience does not have an effect on power (H6a). Years of 
experience in IGR if anything seems to have a negative effect, which however is not 
significant. Having an education in law has a negative and education in politics and public 
administration a positive but also not significant effect on power, a tendency which 
corresponds to the initial expectations (H6b). 
 Conclusion 
This study has provided a new approach to research the power and influence of bureaucratic 
actors in relation to each other. When involved in joint decision-making processes, 
bureaucrats are to different degrees central and powerful during the process and thus have 
different potentials to influence the final decision. This complements the predominantly 
vertical study of bureaucratic influence on politicians, by adding a horizontal perspective. It 
demonstrates that not all bureaucrats involved in a decision-making and coordination process 
are equally powerful and that varying distributions of power resources affect their power and 
influence. 
Organizational and jurisdictional power resources, in contrast to personal power resources, 
thereby seem to matter most in bureaucratic coordination processes, even when politicians are 
not involved. The departments’ bureaucrats often contact bureaucrats representing the 
government chancellery (institutional power). This indicates that the departments, at least in 
this context, indeed include them in the coordination process and share information, 
questioning a dominant departmental orientation (Fleischer, 2011, p. 60). Bureaucrats, whose 
ministers are affiliated to certain political parties, surprisingly the smaller and federal 
opposition parties, play an important and central role in bureaucratic coordination. Thus, party 
politics and functional politicization can make even bureaucratic actors more powerful. In the 
context of German IGR, bureaucratic coordination represents a mechanism to include 
minority and federal opposition parties and thus seems to be oriented on inclusion and 
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consensus. Party politics, hence, should be systematically included in the study of 
bureaucratic politics (see also Brummer, 2017). Furthermore, close coordination with the 
other bureaucrats from the own jurisdiction is also an important power resource. This might 
indicated that in bureaucratic IGR in federal states, in contrast to international relations, the 
two level logic works with a different mechanism. Actors do not become more powerful 
through sectoral constraints by the other departments or political constraints by their coalition 
partners, but rather closeness and coordination among these actors make them more powerful 
because they can jointly pursue their interests. Furthermore, the power resources that actors 
use differ between processes of information exchange and negotiations. The hard power 
resources, voting and financial power, which seem important in international relations, are 
only relevant for bureaucratic intergovernmental coordination, when it comes to negotiations. 
The process of coordination is, thus, more precisely captured by distinguishing these phases.  
An analytical framework for the investigation of power resources of bureaucrats in a 
horizontal perspective is proposed here, which is applicable to IGR in any multilevel state. 
While IGR in multilevel states significantly differ from each other, the hypotheses developed 
are sufficiently broad and can be adapted to varying national and international contexts. Thus, 
they offer a framework to investigate this aspect of bureaucratic IGR in a comparative 
perspective. Furthermore, these findings might also be transferred to the study of inter-
departmental decision-making processes within one government and thus advance public 
administration research in general. 
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